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RECENT DECISION
A CONSIGNMENT APPROACH TO
VERTICAL MARKETING RESTRICTIONS
(UNITED STATES V. ARNOLD, SCHWINN & CO.)
INTRODUCTION
There has been increasing concern, both in Congress2 and the
Supreme Court,3 regarding problems encountered by small, independent
merchants in their attempts to compete effectively with the vertically
integrated "giants."4 Many smaller manufacturers have entered into
franchising5 or limited channels of distribution arrangements in order to
become efficient and effective competitors of the large integrated firms.'
By selectively choosing his dealers, a manufacturer may be assured of
qualified and effective outlets for his products, as well as a stabilization of
distributors and dealers. The public is thus provided with the opportunity
to get a uniform product through small independent businessmen rather
than from a large chain. In these ways, the smaller manufacturer can
theoretically compete effectively with his larger integrated competitor.
A franchise or other form of limited outlet agreement is not, how-
ever, a panacea for the problems of sustaining effective competition
between the "small" and "large" firms. In their attempts to help establish
1. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
2. See Hearings on. Distribution Problenzs Affecting Small Business before the
Seb-Cominittee on Antifrust and Monopoly, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
3. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) ; United States v.
Von's Grocery Co. 384 U.S. 270 (1966) ; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962). It has even been suggested that the Court is at times more interested in
protecting competitors than the competitive process. See Bowman, Restraint of Trade
by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967).
4. Vertical integration is defined by Professor Oppenheim as a "mode of growth
of an enterprise through integration of successive backward or forward steps in the pro-
duction, financing, or distribution of goods or services." G. OPPENHEIM, FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST LAws 429 (2d ed. 1959). The vertically integrated "giants" are the large firms
which control the entire distribution process by integrating forward. There are no in-
dependent distributors or wholesalers; each stage of the distribution process is handled
by the manufacturer.
5. Although different relationships are termed franchising, a franchising arrange-
ment generally involves a license giving permission to engage in a particular type of
business by following an established pattern. E. LEwis & R. HANCOCK, THE FRANCHISE
SYsTEM OF DIsTRBUTON 8 (1963).
6. See E. LEwis & R. HANCOCK, supra note 5; M. WARSHAW, EFFECTIVE SELLING
THROUGH WHOLESALER: (1961); Chadwell & Rhodes, Antitrust Aspects of Dealer
Licensing and Franchising, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1967) ; Hall, Franchising-New Scope
for an Old Technique, 1964 HARv. Bus. R1v. 60; Jones, The Growth of Importance of
Franchising and the Role of Law, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 717 (1967).
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guidelines for product distribution, the courts have been somewhat less
than lucid; consequently, manufacturers have been left to plan distribution
arrangements at their peril.'
In the most recent case concerning restricted channels of distribution,
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,' the Supreme Court leveled a
heavy blow against franchising arrangements. Justice Fortas, speaking
for a majority of the Court, stated that vertically imposed9 restrictions
requiring distributors to confine resales of purchased goods to franchised
dealers were illegal per se.
Schwinn bicycles were marketed primarily by franchised retail
dealers.'" Distribution to these dealers was achieved either through sales
to wholesale distributors, sales to retailers by consignment arrangements
with distributors, or sales to retailers under the "Schwinn Plan" in which
Schwinn ships directly to the retailer and pays a commission to the
distributor who places the order." Each distributor was required to deal
7. For a discussion of customer and territory restrictions involved in product dis-
tribution see Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75
HAnv. L. REv. 795 (1962).
S. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
9. Vertical restrictions are between businessmen on different distribution levels,
whereas horizontal restrictions are among businessmen on the same level of distribution.
A restriction imposed by a manufacturer on a distributor is vertical, and a restriction
agreed upon between two distributors is horizontal.
10. Schwinn formerly sold through unlimited retail outlets; however, as of 1951-52
it reduced its retail outlets from about 15,000 to about 5,500. The bicycle market and
Schwinn's position are as follows:
[i]n 1951 Schwinn had the largest single share of the United States bicycle
market-22.5%. In 1961 Schwinn's share of market had fallen to 12.8% al-
though its dollar and unit sales had risen substantially. In the same period, a
competitor, Murray Ohio Manufacturing company, which is now the leading
United States bicycle producer, increased its market share from 11.6% in 1951
to 22 8% in 1961. Murray sells primarily to Sears, Roebuck & Company and
other mass merchandisers. By 1962 there were nine bicycle producers in the
Nation, operating 11 plants. Imports of bicycles amounted to 29.7% of sales in
1961.
Forty percent of all bicycles are distributed by national concerns which
operate their own stores and franchise others Another 20% are sold by giant
chains and mass merchandisers like Sears and Montgomery Ward & Company.
Sears and Ward together account for 20% of all bicycle sales. Most of these
bicycles are sold under private label. About 30% of all bicycles are distributed
by cycle jobbers which specialize in the trade, and the remaining 10% by hard-
ware and general stores.
Schwinn sells its products primarily to or through 22 wholesale distributors,
with sales to the public being made by a large number of retailers. In addition,
it sells about 11% of its total to B. F. Goodrich for resale in B. F. Goodrich
retail or franchised stores. There are about 5,000 to 6,000 retail dealers in the
United States which are bicycle specialty shops, generally also providing servic-
ing. About 84% of Schwinn's sales are through specialized dealers. Schwinn
sells only under the Schwinn label, never under private label, while about 64%
of all bicycles are sold under private label. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365, 368 (1967).
11. Under the Schwinn Plan, Schwinn also extends credit to its retailers.
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only with franchised retailers within a specific geographical territory.
The Supreme Court upheld these restrictions in the consignment or
agency agreements' 2 with the distributors, but struck down the same
restrictions as illegal per se when distribution was achieved through sales
to the distributors."3
THE LAW PRIOR TO SCHWINN
In previous decisions, courts focused on certain criteria to determine
whether or not a given method of doing business was inherently illegal.
In analyzing marketing restriction agreements, the courts have been
concerned with: the form in which an agreement is cast; who is initiating
the agreement; who is being benefited; and what is the purpose of the
restriction.' 4 In Schwinn, the Supreme Court found the agreements
between Schwinn and its distributors were purely vertical, initiated by
Schwinn for its own benefit, and not ancillary to any conduct which in
itself is illegal per se. These criteria of form, origin, and purpose have
been carefully analyzed before a per se label has been placed on a partic-
ular type of conduct.
Traditionally, the courts have been particularly concerned with the
form of agreement with respect to restraints that are illegal per se.
Marketing restrictions of a non-price-fixing and tie-in nature have been
subject to per se invalidity only when an agreement between parties
standing on a horizontal relationship to each other has been foundY
Historically, horizontal restraints have been considered more pernicious
as they are generally naked restraints of trade with no purpose except
stifling of competition.' 6
In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers v. United States,'7 retail
lumber dealers joined together horizontally to boycott wholesale dealers
12. In a consignment or agency agreement, title, dominion, and risk of loss of
goods remains with the seller.
13. The holding in Schwhim, however, is qualified somewhat. For the restraint not
to be a violation of the Sherman Act, there must be competitive products readily avail-
able-in other words, sufficient interbrand competition. When a manufacturer has a
dominant market position, foreclosure of intrabrand competition is, in effect, foreclosure
of the only competition existing. However, if there is sufficient competition among
various brands (interbrand competition), a restriction on intrabrand competition may
not have an injurious effect on competition in general. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Web-
ster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
14. For a discussion of marketing restrictions which have been considered illegal
refusals to deal see Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U.
PA. L. RFv. 847 (1955).
15. United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127 (1966) ; Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) ; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,
PA. L. Ray. 847 (1955).
16. United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 261, 263 (1963).
17. 234 U.S. 600 (1913).
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who sold directly to consumers and in Fashion Originators Guild of
Amcrica, Inc. v. FTC"5 a large combination of manufacturers of
women's garments boycotted retailers who sold systematically copied
designs. In both cases the form of the agreement was horizontal and
illegal. In Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,9 a combination of
ten major appliance manufacturers and one retailer was formed to sell to
the plaintiff at discriminatory prices or to refuse to sell to him entirely.
The agreement was essentially horizontal and the Court held it was
illegal per se." And in the recent case of United States v. General
Motors,2' G.M. cooperated with a group of its franchised dealers in an
effort to stop bootlegging.22 Labeling this conduct a classic conspiracy
in restraint of trade, the Court had no trouble in applying a per se rule.21
In each of these cases and in other simliar cases in which a per se rule
was applied to combinations foreclosing market entry, the form of the
agreement contained a horizontal element.24
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, has also applied
a per se rule to a purely vertical agreement which limited the class to
whom a product could be resold. In Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto
Sales,2' a new car dealer requested that Ford impose restrictions on all
dealers such that "company cars' '21 purchased from Ford could not be
resold to used car dealers. To protect this dealer, Ford wrote its other
18. 312 U.S. 457 (1940).
19. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
20. The Court concluded that the boycott violated the statute without regard to the
reasonableness of the conduct in the circumstances. A group boycott of a trader was from
its very nature and character unduly restrictive. 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959).
21. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
22. "Bootlegging" is a practice employed in the automobile trade by which discount
houses or other retailers (not franchised automobile dealers) purchase cars from co-
operating franchised dealers and resell them to the public.
In the Los Angeles market, new Chevrolet automobiles were being sold through a
few of the larger discount houses. During 1960, approximately a dozen of the eighty-five
Chevrolet dealers in the area were furnishing cars to the discounters. In response to
numerous complaints by the other Chevrolet dealers and three dealer associations, General
Motors, together with the dealer associations, took steps to elicit from each dealer a
promise not to do business with the discounters. To enforce compliance, General Motors
and the dealer associations established extensive policing techniques.
23. Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the Court, felt that there was no doubt that this
was an appropriate case for the application of a per se rule. He stated: "where business-
men concert their actions in order to deprive others of access to merchandise which the
latter wish to sell to the public, we need not inquire into the economic motivation under-
lying their conduct," United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 146 (1966).
24. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) ; Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Millinary Creators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 469
(1941) ; United States v. First National Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930) ; Paramount
Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 232 U.S. 30 (1930) ; Binderup v. Pathe Exchange,
263 U.S. 291 (1923).
25. 361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966).
26. Company cars were cars driven by Ford employees. Generally they were new
Fords with low mileage.
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dealers asking them not to bid on "company cars' for the purpose of
reselling them to a used car dealer, particularly one in a town other than
that of the purchasing dealer. The plaintiff, a cut-off used car dealer who
had been purchasing "company cars" from a Ford dealer, alleged a
horizontal conspiracy. The court denied the existence of any horizontal
conspiracy, but felt the presence of a vertical agreement alone rendered
the conduct illegal per se."7
When a vertical restriction is present, illegality may hinge on what
is sought to be accomplished; that is whether the manufacturer is acting
for his own economic betterment or is attempting to benefit his distribu-
tors by stifling competition is important.28 In Klors, the agreement did
not benefit the manufacturers, but only the dealers selling their products.
The purpose of the agreement was to eliminate one competitor so that
the other retailers could maintain their hold on the market. Likewise, in
General Motors and Ford, the agreements were primarily for the economic
benefit of the dealers. Thus in General Motors the dealers persuaded
G.M. to impose restrictions which would prevent a diminution of their
market share and in Ford, although the agreement was vertical, it had the
sole purpose and effect of benefiting a Ford dealer and consequently
achieved the same result as if the agreement were horizontal.
In cases where a horizontal agreement is entered into to deny a
competitor access to a market, experience has shown that these agree-
ments have no purpose other than stifling of competition." Likewise,
where the purpose of an agreement is solely to benefit one competitor at
the expense of another, even though it is vertically imposed, per se
illegality may be proper.
THE SCHWINN CASE
In Schawinn, the factual situation was somewhat different from that
of previous cases; the agreement was not horizontal, nor was it initiated
solely to benefit Schwinn's distributors or retailers. The situation is
best illustrated in the Court's own words:
... we are dealing here with a vertical restraint embodying the
unilateral program of a single manufacturer. We are not dealing
with a combination of manufacturers, as in Kior's, or of distri-
butors, as in General Motors. We are not dealing with a
"division" of territory in the sense of an allocation by and
among the distributors,... or an agreement among distributors
27. 361 F.2d 874, 881 (1st Cir. 1966).
28. United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
29. Id.
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to restrict their competition,3"
. . . [nior is this a case of territorial or dealer restrictions
accompanied by a price fixing, for here the issue of unlawful
price fixing was tendered, litigated, decided against the appel-
lant, and appellant has not appealed ......
\\e are here concerned with a truly vertical arrangement, raising
the fundamental question of the degree to which a manufacturer
may not only select the customers to whom he will sell, but also
allocate territories for resale and confine access to his product
to selected, or franchised, retailers.32
Using the criteria of form, purpose, and origin of the agreement, a
proper analysis of previous cases certainly does not require the application
of a per se rule in Sciwinn. The agreement, purely vertical in nature,
originates with and is designed to benefit Schwinn and is not ancillary
to conduct already illegal per se. On the basis of these criteria, Schwinn
is distinguishable from previous cases applying a per se rule to distribu-
tion control restrictions.
In addition, the Court does not deal adequately with the one case,
United States v. White Motor Co.,33 which discussed a type of distribu-
tion practice quite similar to that in Schwiznn. In White Motor, the Court
was asked to extend the ban against horizontal combinations among
competitors to a vertical arrangement which limited both the territory
in which and the class of merchants to whom a distributor could sell. The
Court, declining to apply a per se rule, stated: "[[w] e do not know enough
of the economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements
emerge to be certain. They may be too dangerous to sanction or they may
be allowable protections against the aggressive competitors or the only
practicable means a small company has for breaking into or staying in
business ... and within the 'rule of reason.' 134
In W1Vhite Motor, the Court held that, as to horizontal practices
found to be per se violations, experience and analysis established the utter
lack of justification to excuse their inherent threat to competition. How-
ever, experience did not warrant the conclusion that vertical restraints
have the same pernicious effect upon competition.3" Inquiry into the
effect upon competition and economic justification had not been made
with regard to vertical agreements and, therefore, they were not to be
30. 388 U.S. 365, 378 (1967).
31. Id. at 373.
32. Id. at 378.
33. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
34. Id. at 263.
35. Id.
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judged by the same standard as horizontal agreements.3"
In Schwinn, the Court alludes to White Motor and states it is not
ready to introduce the inflexibility of a per se rule3" to prohibit all
vertical restrictions because of the possibility of "serverely hampering"
smaller enterprises in their attempts to compete with the "giants"38 ;
however, the Court holds that when the manufacturer parts with title,
vertical resale restrictions are illegal per se.3" The Court then justifies
this conclusion on the basis of the ancient rule against restraints on
alienation." This rule may have been proper when a manufacturer had
no legitimate interest in his product after it left his hands; however,
with mass advertising and sophisticated marketing techniques, the manu-
facturer of today has a great interest in where and how his goods are
sold."'
36. Id.
37. It is interesting to note that the government may not have argued that a per se
rule should apply to vertical resale marketing restrictions. In oral argument, the govern-
ment distinguished Schwinn from other cases, and felt that because the agreement was
vertical and initiated by Schwinn, a per se rule was not applicable. 35 U.S.L.W. 3372
(U.S. Apr. 25, 1967). It is not clear, however, whether the government was referring
only to agency agreements (as they were the only ones on appeal) or to all vertical
restrictions. The argument can be made that the government felt all vertical marketing
restrictions should be judged by a rule of reason. It should be noted that the govern-
ment has not appealed from two vertical marketing decisions, both decided after
White Motor. This may be viewed as a tacit recoguition of the propriety of applying a
rule of reason to certain vertical marketing restrictions. See text following note 53,
infra.
38. 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967).
39. Although the Court holds that when the manufacturer parts with title any ef-
fort to restrict the persons to whom the product is resold is a per se violation of section 1,
a limited exception may be recognized. The Court states that the facts of this case do
not come within the illustrations of White Motor because Schwinn is neither a failing
company nor a new company breaking into the market. It can, therefore, be assumed
that if a company is a failing company or a new entrant, any vertical restrictions will
be mesured by a "rule of reason" under White Motor. In this respect, the Court does
not repudiate White as Mr. Justice Stewart suggests in his dissent, but rather unfor-
tunately limits the application of the rule of reason to vertical agreements which involve
a new entrant or a failing company.
40. 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967).
41. Mr. Justice Stewart traces the origin of this rule to Coke on Littleton. 2 CoIXE,
INSTITUTES OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND § 360 (Day ed. 1812). He states:
[c]enturies ago, it could perhaps be assumed that a manufacturer had no
legitimate interest in what happened to his products once he had sold them to
a middleman and they had started their way down the channel of distribution.
But this assumpion no longer holds true in a day of sophisticated marketing
policies, mass advertising, and vertically integrated manufacturer-distributors.
: I . In any event, the state of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is
irrelevant to the issue before us: the effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical
distributional restraints in the American economy today. The problems involved
are difficult and complex, and our response should be more reasoned and sensi-
tive than the simple acceptance of a hoary formula. "It does seem possible that
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have contributed legal conceptions grow-
ing out of new types of business which makes it inappropriate" for the Court
to base its "overthrow of contemporary commercial policies on judicial views of
the reign of Queen Elizabeth." 388 U.S. at 392.
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The distribution path after Schwinn for manufacturers to insure that
their products are sold only by selected retail outlets is through an
"agency" route. 2 When the arrangement between a manufacturer and a
distributor is a "sale," a per se rule is applicable to marketing restrictions
similar to those present in Schwinn but, if the arrangement is designated
as an "agency" agreement, these same restrictions are not illegal per se.
This is a curious distinction to make because in Simpson v. Union Oil
Co., 3 the Court explicitly emphasized that differences in form do not
represent differences in substance. In Schwinn by making a "sale" versus
"agency" distinction, the Court appears to be more concerned with the
form in which the agreement is drafted than with its economic function
and competitive effect. As the dissent points out, the record did not show
that the competitive consequences of Schwinn's distribution program
necessarily differed when Schwinn sold its bicycles to the distributors or
entered into consignment agreements.44
The Court, in United States v. Masonite Corp.,4" stated:
[s] o far as the Sherman Act is concerned, the result must turn
not on the skill with which counsel has manipulated the con-
42. A manufacturer may decide not to use any intermediary form of distribution,
but rather sell directly to retail outlets. Absent monopolistic purposes, the manufacturer
has the right to deal with whomever he chooses and the limited right to establish the
price at which his product is sold. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960) ; United States v. Colgate & Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
However, in order to handle the distribution function better, rather than selling
directly to retail outlets, the manufacturer may be forced to channel his product through
independent distributors. "Historically, intermediaries (distributors) arose because of
the cost savings and efficiencies involved in time and cost of communication and trans-
portation by reducing the number of transactions necessary to get a product from the
manufacturer to the consumer." V. Alderson, Distribution Channels (1966). By
using distributors, a manufacturer can assure himself of a greater possibility of reach-
ing the market, making his product more widely and readily available to the "searching"
consumer. A manufacturer who wishes to reach a large segment of the market is usually
in no position to deal directly with retailers, but must channel his product through
wholesale distributors.
If a manufacturer does not choose to distribute through independent wholesalers, he
may decide to integrate forward into the distribution function. As the distribuors are
then merely employees of the manufacturer, they can be told to whom to sell the product.
However, vertical integration presents many problems. By vertically integrating,
the manufacturer is replacing the small, independent businessmen with his own em-
ployees, a result surely not within the spirit of the antitrust laws. In addition, many
larger manufacturers are reluctant to integrate forward into the wholesaling function;
they prefer to use their capital for other purposes such as advertising, research, and de-
velopment. The most recurrent consideration, however, against smaller manufacturers
deciding not to integrate forward is simply financial inability. For a further discussion
of this problem, see note 7 supra.
43. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
44. 388 U.S. 365, 393 (1967).
45. 316 U.S. 265 (1941).
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cepts of 'sale' and 'agency' but on the significance of the business
practices in terms of restraint of trade.48
By labeling vertical "sale" restrictions illegal per se, the Court
ignores the "economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements
emerge." There is no showing of the economic differences between a sale
or a consignment method of distribution and their consequent effects
upon competition. White Motor called for the examination of vertical
agreements in their competitive context to determine whether or not they
were too restrictive. In Schwht, however, without examining the econo-
mic consequences of vertical sale restrictions, the Court determines that
they were too restrictive.
A further examination of vertical restrictions may reveal that there
is sufficient economic justification for their presence. Smaller manufac-
turers may find that in order to compete successfully with larger manu-
facturers of other brands, it is necessary to have more control over who
sells their products. By selecting only certain dealers to represent him, a
manufacturer has the opportunity to compete effectively without develop-
ing a chain store or large integrated operation.47 An independent dealer-
ship organization avoids the problems of large-scale capital investment
and the costs of management and sales staffs necessary to vertical
integration.48
More important, however, by carefully choosing his outlets, a
smaller manufacturer may insure that only well trained and aggressive
salesman handle his product. He may insure that he is represented by
businessmen who act to the best of their ability, take responsibility for
adjusting customer problems, and use ingenuity to profit from an extra
effort.49 In addition, a manufacturer benefits from the independent
businessman's sense of responsibility, industriousness, attention to costs,
and a desire to earn a profit.-°
The willingness of a potential customer to buy a manufacturer's
product may often be influenced by the customer's opportunity to secure
prompt repairs, services, and instructions on proper use of the product."'
Consequently, the manufacturer does not want just anybody "selling its
product in a carton, collecting the price paid, 'kissing the customer
goodbye,' depositing his profit and forgetting the customer, manufacturer,
46. Id. at 280.
47. Jones, The Growth and Importance of Franchising and the Role of Law, 12
ANTITRUST BULL. 717, 723 (1967).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 724.
50. Id.
51. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 338 (N.D. IIl. 1965).
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and the public generally. ' '1 2
Considering these factors which entice a customer to buy, a manu-
facturer would seem to have sufficient reasons to justify limiting dis-
tribution to outlets which offer significant customer services. Although
enforcement of this policy results in a denial of some access to the market
for the manufacturer's product, the manufacturer nevertheless has a
legitimate interest in how his goods are marketed; thus, a restraint of this
type is much different than one imposed solely to benefit a particular
seller. The manufacturer may not be trying to place a restraint upon the
distributor to benefit another, but rather a sanction to insure that his
planning concerning the market segment to be served is realized. The
manufacturer is using his economic power to benefit himself.
In two Federal Trade Commission decisions since White Motor,
Sandura Co. v. FTC3 and Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC,4 a per se
approach to vertical marketing restrictions has been rejected. In Sandura,
the court upheld Sandura's vertical restrictions to enable a small manu-
facturer to compete more effectively with the large firms in the floor-
covering industry and, in Snap-On, the court upheld Snap-On's restric-
tions on the basis of maintaining better interbrand competition in the
hand tool industry. Neither of these cases has been appealed, and one
writer feels that this may be viewed as a tacit recognition that vertical
marketing restrictions may be justified under the rule of reason in appro-
priate cases."5
In Snap-On, the court stated that:
. .. manufacturers should be encouraged by the workings of the
anti-trust laws to meet and prorriote competition of their pro-
ducts with those of competing brands, rather than to be ham-
pered by those laws in the 'orderly marketing of [their] pro-
ducts.'
By applying a per se rule to vertical resale marketing restrictions, the
Court in Schiwinm may be using the antitrust laws to hamper the orderly
marketing of goods and prevent competition among competing brands.
The Court in White Motor did not apply a per se rule to restrictions
similar to those in Schwin on the grounds that the economic conse-
quences of such agreements were not known. In Schwinn, however, a per
se rule was applied without investigating and settling the inquiries
52. Id.
53. 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
54. 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
55. Handler, Recent Antitrust Developnents-r965, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 823, 850
(1965).
56. 321 F.2d 825, 833 (7th Cir. 1963).
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invited by the Court in White Motor. It is questionable whether the
Supreme Court in Schwinn had sufficient knowledge of the adverse
competitive effects of vertical restrictions to justify the use of a per se
rule.
James K. Gardner
